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A Commentary on
Utility-free heuristicmodels of two-option choice canmimic predictions of utility-stagemodels
under many conditions.
by Piantadosi, P. T., and Hayden, B. (2015). Front. Neurosci. 9:105. doi: 10.3389/fnins.2015. 00105
Many neuroeconomic studies in the past 10 years have reported neural signals encoding the
subjective value (or utility) of offered and chosen goods (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011; Bartra et al.,
2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2014; but see O’Doherty, 2014). The precise mechanisms through
which values are compared to make a decision remain unclear and are matter of current research.
However, the fact that neurons in the orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortices encode the
subjective value of offered and chosen goods, taken together with the fact that lesions to these same
areas selectively disrupt economic decisions (Camille et al., 2011), strongly suggests that economic
choices are ultimately based on these value signals (Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Rangel and Hare,
2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). These results are generally viewed as a significant breakthrough
compared to standard and behavioral economic theories, where subjective value (or utility) enters
as an “as if ” concept. In a recent paper, Piantadosi andHayden (2015) challenge this understanding.
Goods available for choice can generally vary on multiple dimensions (or attributes), and by
definition subjective values integrate all the dimensions relevant to the decision. The authors first
examine the specific case in which choices are made between two options that depend only on
quantity and probability (two parametric dimensions). Building on an argument originally put
forth by Tversky (1969), they show that decisions based on an integrated utility (algorithm 1) cannot
be distinguished from decisions based on a utility-free heuristic (algorithm 2). According to this
second algorithm, subjects would first identify the attribute with highest variance and then choose
according to that attribute alone (dimensional prioritization). This heuristic does not include the
computation of any utility. The authors go on to claim that the same argument applies very
broadly to binary decisions between goods that vary on two or more dimensions, provided that
the dimensions are decomposable into additive functions. In the last part of the paper, they claim
that similar arguments apply to neural data and that neural signals previously found to encode
subjective value “may arise artifactually from utility-free heuristic processes.”
The paper is interesting for it highlights one of the challenges in linking a behavioral choice or
a neural signal to the computation of subjective values. Importantly, if the algorithm of Piantadosi
and Hayden applied as broadly as the authors claim it does, a pillar of neuroeconomics would
find itself on shaky ground. However, upon a closer examination it appears clear that the authors
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greatly overstated their case, and that the domain of decisions
to which their utility-free heuristic applies is actually rather
limited. In particular, algorithm 2 fails whenever choices are
made between qualitatively different (incommensurable) goods.
After discussing the specific case in which options depend only
on quantity and probability, the authors write:
“Moreover, there is nothing special about the fact that these choices
involve risk. For example, in a well-known study, subjects choose
between two amounts of juice that differ in flavor and quantity
(Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006). [...] It is plausible to assume
that in [that study], the utility of each option may be a product of
its scalar values along the two dimensions. If so, it is straightforward
to create a utility-free algorithm that makes the same choices as the
choice model using the same principles”
This statement is actually incorrect. Consider a subject choosing
between different quantities of apple juice and orange juice.
Importantly, flavor is a subjective and complex sensation that
cannot be reduced to the sum of simple components (Small,
2012; Spence, 2015). Thus different flavors are effectively
incommensurable commodities. The statement is incorrect
because there is no parametric dimension alongwhich two flavors
can be assigned a scalar value. Put in a different way, consider
decisions between option 1 = [apple flavor, quantity 1] and
option 2 = [orange flavor, quantity 2]. If the first dimension
was probability instead of flavor, one could say that probability
1 is larger or smaller than probability 2. But one cannot say that
apple flavor is larger or smaller than orange flavor: such statement
would be meaningless. As a consequence, one cannot compute
the variance in the flavor dimension, as required by algorithm
2. The only way to compare apple flavor and orange flavor is to
compute their subjective value, which is precisely what Piantadosi
and Hayden argue against. Thus, algorithm 2 cannot account for
choices as simple as that between an apple and an orange. More
generally, algorithm 2 fails whenever choices are made between
incommensurable goods.
Algorithm 2 also fails in simple cases where goods vary only
on parametric dimensions. For example, consider the choice
between two lottery tickets. Each ticket costs Ci dollars and pays
Ri dollars with probability Pi (i = 1, 2). Lets consider the
simple case of linear value function and risk indifference. In
the integrated value framework, choices are made according to
the utility function U = P R – C. This utility function cannot
be decomposed into additive functions. Thus, the argument of
Piantadosi and Hayden falls.
Note that choices between incommensurable goods are not
esoteric cases—they are ubiquitous in the life of humans and
other animals. For example, people make such choices every
time they exchange money for another commodity—work, food,
sex, etc. Likewise, choices where attributes include quantity,
a multiplicative dimension such as probability or time, and
an additive dimension such as cost are very common. The
vast majority of daily economic decisions seem to fall in one
of those classes, and algorithm 2 cannot account for any
of them.
The issues raised above are also relevant to the neuroscience
implications discussed in the paper. Much of the evidence for
neural signals encoding the subjective value of offered and chosen
goods comes from studies in which choices were made between
qualitatively different goods. These include the juice choice study
discussed above and many other (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad,
2006; Plassmann et al., 2007; Valentin et al., 2007; FitzGerald
et al., 2009; Raghuraman and Padoa-Schioppa, 2014). Contrary
to the claims of Piantadosi and Hayden, the results presented
in their paper do not provide any indication that neural value
signals found in those studies “may arise artifactually from utility-
free heuristic processes.” Indeed, Piantadosi and Hayden have not
“identified a potential confound to neural correlates of utility” in
those studies.
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